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Abstract:
In recent years various domestic and international organisations have proposed financial coverage for the 
population as a whole. This does not mean that there is currently no coverage: aid in different countries extends 
to different levels. In this context a universal basic social benefit could be one way of responding to those in-
ternational proposals. However, such a scheme might be too expensive to be viable, which might lead instead 
to partial benefits payable to non-workers being considered, as the group in most need of coverage. This paper 
seeks to analyse whether a model of financing can be found under which a basic minimum social benefit can be 
implemented in a way that is socially and financially viable and sustainable and can be maintained over time.
Following the usual system for the distribution of budget allocations by public administrations, this model 
uses a multi-year period – in this case 12 financial years. Spain is presented as a case study, based on a number of 
forward-looking demographic and economic assumptions in which the various aid systems used in the country’s 
autonomous regions are brought together to provide a minimum coverage.
The main conclusion drawn is that the current level of contributions is sufficient to provide a viable, sustai-
nable partial social benefit. However, a universal benefit would require a considerable increase in extraordinary 
contributions to meet its cost, though those contributions could be replaced in part by extraordinary state contri-
butions or funding from other sources.
Keywords:
Social Welfare, pay as you go, basic social benefit, Social Security cost.
Resumen:
Existen organizaciones tanto nacionales como internacionales que en los últimos años proponen una cober-
tura económica general para la población. No es que no exista un grado de cobertura, sino que los países dispo-
nen de unas fuentes de ayudas que alcanzan a ciertos niveles. Ante ello, una prestación social básica universal, 
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puede ser la respuesta a las anteriores propuestas internacionales. Sin embargo, podría ocurrir que un excesivo 
coste implicase su no viabilidad y se buscasen coberturas parciales, como una prestación social a abonar a los 
no trabajadores, al ser éstos los que inicialmente demandarían la cobertura.  El objetivo del presente trabajo es 
analizar un modelo de financiación que haga viable y sostenible económica, social y temporalmente la implanta-
ción de la prestación social básica mínima.
Este modelo aun siguiendo un sistema de reparto habitual en los presupuestos de la administración, tiene 
en cuenta un periodo plurianual de varios años -12 ejercicios económicos. Se realiza una aplicación práctica al 
caso español bajo una serie de asunciones demográficas y económicas a futuro, donde se constata una pluralidad 
autonómica de ayudas  que se aúnan para conseguir una cobertura mínima.
Como principal conclusión se obtiene que haciendo uso de las cotizaciones actualmente existentes se consta-
ta la viabilidad y sostenibilidad de una prestación social parcial. Sin embargo, una prestación universal requiere 
un aumento considerable de las cotizaciones extraordinarias necesarias financiar su coste, si bien éstas podrían 
sustituirse en parte por aportaciones extraordinarias del Estado u otros recursos que permitan financiarla.
Palabras clave:
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1. INTRODUCTION
The idea of a basic social benefit is based on a proposal made by the International La-
bour Organisation –ILO- (ILO 2012) in regard to basic national social welfare protection 
systems and a commitment by the European Parliament to see that governments guarantee 
the basic financial security of their populations (European Parliament 2010). These pro-
posals are in line with the recommendation made by the World Bank in 2005, with the 
incorporation of a “zero pillar” of social protection (Holzman & Hinz 2005) referred to as 
a “non-contributory basic pension”.
In Spain the system of contributory social security payments includes the first pillar in 
the World Bank’s proposal, and there is coincidence as to the second and third basic pillars 
of social protection in place. However, two further pillars are incorporated here: a “zero pi-
llar” comprising a financial allocation sufficient to ensure that all citizens of a country can, 
each with his/her own possibilities and characteristics, meet the minimum necessities for 
survival taking into account the demographic and economic circumstances of that country 
(Cichon & Hagemejer 2004; Kulke 2007); and a fourth pillar dealing with health services 
and housing provided mainly by family members. The ILO (ILO 2012) currently proposes 
a basic level of social welfare protection, acknowledging that social security is a vital tool 
for public sector social policies to prevent and reduce poverty, inequality, exclusion and 
social insecurity, promote equal opportunities and prevent discrimination on grounds of 
race and gender.
In regard to the basic pillar of welfare provision, Spain is not starting from zero. There 
are already non-contributory minimum benefits available within the Social Security sys-
tem subject to the minimum financial requirements of households, and the same goes for 
unemployment benefits. Moreover, authority for managing guaranteed minimum income 
payments has been devolved to the country’s autonomous regional communities (ARCs). 
In spite of this network of benefits there is no single, integrated system for assuring that 
all citizens have equal coverage and receive benefits that guarantee a minimum standard 
of living.
This minimum, common basic coverage needs to be backed by a funding model that 
can ensure the viability and financial and social sustainability over time of universal basic 
minimum social benefits (BSB). Those benefits should reach most of the population, and 
should cover their basic necessities for living. 
This paper seeks to establish a funding model under which BSB is viable and finan-
cially and socially sustainable over time. Accordingly, the following section examines the 
characteristics required of a BSB funding model. Section 3 then estimates the cost of im-
plementing such a funding model for benefit payable to the whole population of Spain in 
2010. 
Section 4 looks at cost forecasts for the following 12 years under three different de-
mographic and economic scenarios. Finally, the Conclusions section sets out a number of 
comments and points out the implications of setting the basic level of benefit proposed by 
the ILO. The paper ends with a list of bibliographic references.
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2. BASIC FEATURES OF THE FUNDING MODEL
An actuarial financial system is used to ensure proper coordination between the type 
and quantity of benefits paid to beneficiaries and the wages for remuneration of contribu-
tors included in the provision, so as to forestall any problems of insolvency over time and 
cater for the resulting socio-economic vicissitudes (De La Peña 2000). The characteristics 
of the models used depend on the following parameters (ILO 2002):
1. the extent of group solidarity;
2. the level and method of financing; and
3. the sources of funding.
In general, there are three ways of providing financing (ILO 2002):
i. allocation, in which there is hardly any advance funding;
ii. capitalisation; and
iii. capitalisation of risk-bearing capital.
Short-term pension systems are generally funded via the allocation method, because 
the benefits involved are short-term promises and they can be adapted relatively quickly 
to changes in demographic and economic circumstances. This means that large financial 
reserves do not need to be built up to meet funding obligations in the remote future.
In recent years there has been fierce debate in international circles concerning the pros 
and cons of increasing capitalisation in national pension systems (Beetsma & Oksanen 
2007). Social Security pension systems do not really require the financial security that 
high levels of capitalisation can provide for small, private systems, but other reasons for 
adopting capitalisation-based pension systems are frequently given. It is claimed that such 
systems can increase national savings, since high levels of savings may coincide with low 
levels of pension reserves and vice versa (Cadarso & Febrero 2003). Capitalisation is fre-
quently claimed to stimulate growth in capital markets (Doménech 2014), but the proofs 
of that claim are far from categorical: emerging stock markets have obtained impressive 
growth rates in countries where there are few, if any, capitalisation-based pension plans. 
Capitalisation is also said to help insulated pension schemes from the negative effects of 
ageing (ILO 2002). This may be true in the case of small insured groups within society, 
or in a small country with in a globalised economy, but it is not true overall for national 
societies or for globalised society as a whole. Societies have to earmark a certain amount of 
resources to provide a given level of consumer spending for the elderly. The basic equation 
for equating income (from contributions and taxation) and expenditure (benefits) does not 
change if one switches from a wage-based funding system to one based on capitalisation. 
Ultimately, consumer spending by pensioners must be funded with the current GDP produ-
ced by the economically active population (ILO 2002).
However, capitalisation frameworks operate according to the principle that pensioners 
can sell their financial assets to economically active generations (or use them as collate-
ral) so as to generate cash income. If the purchasing generation becomes smaller then a 
reduction in the prices of assets can be expected, and this in turn will reduce the retirement 
income of the next-generation. 
To cover this basic benefit it is therefore necessary: 
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i) to consider the composition and population demographics of society and a mini-
mum income level required to cover spending on basic necessities; 
ii) to allow for a redistribution of income across the whole population based on a 
responsible attitude on the part of states; and 
iii) to allow rapid adaptation to changing needs.
The system that best fits these characteristics is the allocation system (Thullen 1977). 
This is the most widely used system in Europe for funding social benefits, because it allows 
annual budget balances to be drawn up. We therefore use this system for financing the im-
plementation of a funding model for universal basic benefits. 
3. THE FUNDING MODEL
In line with Thullen (1977), actuarial financial equivalence entails the following for the 
whole funding system 
where
: for the time period [t
n,
 t
n+1
] this indicates the total pension expenditure 
updated to the commencement of the said period. 
If in the above equivalence the initial population to be covered at the start of the period 
l(tn)is considered in both terms and the expenditure function B(τ) is split into two factors, 
PM(τ) or the average pension payable at time  for the group of beneficiaries lb(τ), at the 
commencement of the period the following results:
This funding model considers three basic factors that condition its viability and imple-
mentation: 
i) the demographic factor for the population in question; 
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ii) the labour market factor, including the wage bill of the population actually in 
work as a proportion of the full population; 
iii)  the institutional factor, which breaks down into two sub-factors:
iii.1) the coverage of the system, which refers to the number of beneficiaries as a pro-
portion of the general population; and 
iii.2) the generosity of the system, which refers to the amount of financial benefits paid 
out, measured according to the purposes of the benefit to be covered. 
The theory of insurance states that the viability of the system increases in proportion to 
the size of the group insured (Vallejo & Solórzano 2013). This is the theory of large num-
bers, upon which actuarial calculations are based. Thus, national welfare provision systems 
with broad coverage generally feature more stable income than systems limited to smaller 
groups. Moreover, variations in benefits (i.e. the financial risk) among larger groups are 
inevitably smaller than in smaller groups, which also helps to stabilise their financial posi-
tion (Jørgensen & Holzmann 2003). 
Doubts are currently being cast on the viability of the current Social Security system 
in Spain, and a trend is observed towards a division in solidarity groups by autonomous 
regions. In this context the most extreme case is that of individual accounts. Logically, a 
tendency for the nationwide, solidarity-based welfare provision system to be broken down 
into smaller groups which are required to be self-financing inevitably leads to greater dis-
parities in the levels of coverage offered by provisions (García-Núñez 2002). This in turn 
inevitably leads to inequalities and uncertainty in regard to provisions (ILO 2002). 
National social security systems are generally funded via:
1. contributions paid by employers and/or workers;
2. taxation, as a part of the general revenue of the government or with specific 
taxes levied for this purpose; 
3. revenue from eligible investments; and 
4. private payments or insurance premiums.
In practice, most national social security systems are funded from a combination of 
sources. The above model can therefore be considered with the contributions made by the 
various public administrations in Spain and taking into account any annual surpluses or 
losses. Take the following notation: 
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Given the degree of social welfare coverage provided and the total cost that may be 
entailed, governments are often unable to finance the system solely from general tax re-
venue. One widely applied solution is to set up specific social security legislation to fund 
the system via compulsory contributions that are used exclusively for purposes specified in 
that legislation. This is the solution that we consider most appropriate.
However, governments may also give a specific mandate to private bodies to finance 
or co-finance the system and take charge of it, or may decide to leave the matter up to 
voluntary initiatives. Private services, be they compulsory or voluntary, are often seen 
as a suitable way of maintaining low levels of public spending (defined broadly to inclu-
de social security spending funded via contributions). However it is wrong to think that 
private benefits have no effect on public finances: the government’s contingent liabilities 
are the guarantee of last resort for most social transfers (both public and private) paid to 
the population. Therefore, even though gross social spending is much higher when social 
welfare provision is handled by the public sector, net social spending totals more or less 
the same amount in Sweden, where the welfare provision system is publicly managed in 
its entirety and in the USA, where it is managed jointly by the public and private sectors. 
The actual level of spending is practically the same in both countries but the results are 
radically different in social terms, mainly because privately managed social spending is 
distributed far more unevenly than public spending (ILO 2002). The financing system used 
to fund universal basic social benefit in this study is therefore an allocation system funded 
via contributions paid by employers and/or workers, since we believe that this makes for a 
more equitable distribution of expenditure across the whole population.
4. THE COST OF THE MODEL IN SPAIN 
After selecting an allocation-type funding model, the next step is to calculate the esti-
mated cost for the whole population of Spain in 2010, and to estimate the costs for the next 
12 financial years. This also necessarily entails defining the benefit to be paid. 
4.1. The Benefit 
The first step is to determine how generous the system is to be, i.e. the actual amount 
payable as BSB. This amount generally depends on the financial resources available to 
the central government or autonomous regional community (ARC), on political viability, 
on whether there are other, analogous benefits that it can replace, etc. (Noguera 2002). 
However, some researchers propose different amounts, e.g. a universal benefit with amou-
nts differing depending on place of residence, age, family circumstances and other factors 
(Sanzo 2011; Pinilla 2004, 2006).
The amount payable could also be set arbitrarily according to an external factor (the 
Multiple Effect Public Income Indicator –IPREM – in Spain) or a regularly set income le-
vel (the statutory minimum wage), or indeed it could be set in line with the purpose of the 
benefit itself, i.e. guaranteeing a minimum level of social protection.
In line with this approach, Peña Miguel et al. (2015) set benefit amounts based on basic 
or primary necessities for subsistence (food, clothing and footwear, accommodation and 
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public transport) (Clark 2005), which people living below the poverty line find it difficult 
to meet (Guio 2005). They determine the specific factors involved on the basis of the EPF 
(Spanish Household Budget Survey) for 2010 and other studies (Alcon et al. 2002) that 
break down spending in Spain. 
From this viewpoint, Peña Miguel et al. (2015) define the BSB as a financial assigna-
tion paid annually to each citizen that is sufficient to cater for their minimum requirements 
for survival in accordance with their age, town of residence, employment situation, num-
ber of dependents and region of residence (Autonomous Regional Community in Spain). 
Using an inter-quartile regression model, they also find a quantitative relationship between 
the amount of total household spending devoted to basic necessities (as a proxy for house-
hold income (Aldás et al. 2006)) and the significant factors listed above, which are also the 
variables or factors used each year in the EPF and in earlier studies (Camacho & Hernán-
dez 2008; Mañas et al. 2002) of the determinants of spending in Spain. They consider that 
these factors may influence household spending. 
Under a simple annual allocation system, the equivalence between the contributions 
paid in a year and the benefits for outlay in that year is established. The following points 
must be taken into account in that equivalence:
a)  There may be no external funding.
b) Wage-related contributions and contributions from the state used to fund current so-
cial welfare benefits can be included, because if BSB is implemented then other aids 
will clearly be cancelled or phased out. However, no additional budgetary efforts are 
envisaged, i.e. the budget allocation committed remains the same.  
c) A reserve fund may be envisaged for surpluses generated, to cater for unforeseen 
circumstances, time lags or deficits at certain times, so as to prevent such short-term 
time lags or deficits from causing imbalances in the funding model. 
By applying the quantitative factors obtained from the regression (Peña Miguel et al. 
2015) to the sample in the EPF for 2010, the aggregate amount of the benefit and the in-
dividual benefits payable to each of the 22,203 individuals surveyed can be obtained. The 
raising factor2 for the National Employment Office (INE) simple is then extrapolated to the 
complete population in 2010 of 45,147,618 (INE 2010). This results in an average benefit 
of €3820.48 per annum for universal coverage, with a total universal benefit expenditure 
PSBT2010 as follows:
For a partial benefit PSBP2010 such as that paid for instance in Canada and Mexico to all 
those individuals who are not in work (the unemployed, pensioners and other non-wage-
2  This is equivalent to the number of people represented by the individual taking the survey and the sum of all the 
raising factors is equal to the total Spanish population in 2010.
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earners) would give an average BSB of €4,694.59 per annum and a total expenditure on 
partial BSB (PSBP2010) as follows:
The benefits payable to those not in work are equivalent to 43.40% of the universal 
BSB for 2010 (Figure 1). 
Figure 1
Comparison between partial & universal BSB for financial year 2010
Source: Own elaboration.
4.2. Funding via contributions only 
Once the amount of the benefit to be paid is determined, it is possible to work out the 
level of contributions required to fund it exclusively via wages. If other sources of funding 
are used (employers’ contributions via profits, specific taxes, etc) this figure would be redu-
ced, so the initial percentage actually represents the maximum contribution that individuals 
in work would have to make in order to fund universal or partial benefits, as the case may 
be.
In Spain the Wage Structure Survey (EES) for 2010 (EES 2010) shows the gross amou-
nt paid in wages to the population of the country that year, broken down by age brackets. 
The amount obtained for the sample is extrapolated to the full number of persons in work 
in Spain in 2010 (18,408,100). This figure is obtained from the Labour Force Survey (EPA 
2010). The result is as follows:
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Universal and partial BSB payments would thus amount to the following percentages 
of the total wage bill for 2010 in Spain:
This percentage represents the maximum proportion of wage income from workers that 
would have to be redistributed to fund the BSB for that year. If a universal benefit is con-
sidered, then workers themselves also receive a BSB payment in line with their minimum 
needs for living and their family circumstances. The annual cost of universal BSB thus 
works out to 16.5% of GDP for 2010, while that of partial BSB would be 7.16%. 
4.3. Funding via wage-related and state contributions
These findings imply that implementing a BSB as a zero pillar of social welfare provi-
sion in Spain would simplify minimum benefits, guaranteed minimum income and similar 
payments and avoid duplications. However it would also mean that the funding currently 
allocated to such benefits would have to be redirected to fund the level of protection indi-
cated here. 
Table 1
Current state contributions that would be subsumed into BSB (in millions of euros)
Benefit Contribution in 2010
Regional guaranteed minimum incomes (100%) 766.73
Non-contributory pensions, social integration & job placement for the 
disabled (LISMI), statutory old-age & invalidity cover (SOVI) & other 
subsidies (100%) 13,828.12
Contributory pensions (35%) 37,033.06
Unemployment: contributory level (85%) 20,931.25
Non-contributory pension quota (100%) 142.57
State contributions 2010 72,701.73
Source: Own work based on data from the General Intervention Board of the State Administration (IGAE), Min-
istry of the Treasury & Public Administration 2010.
In 2010 a total of €766.7 million was allocated to guaranteed minimum income (RMI 
in Spanish) (Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality 2014). Apart from this aid, 
the public social security system also provided top-up payments to make up the mini-
mum amounts for pensions and non-contributory benefits for low-income recipients. Such 
supplements amounted to €8,903 million that year, out of a total for all subsidies paid out 
of €13,828 million (Table 1). 
BSB would lead to changes in levels of protection. Pensioners would continue to recei-
ve their pensions as usual, though they would be funded from different sources. On the one 
hand they would receive BSB and on the other a supplement based on their contributions 
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during their working lives. Within the system for funding BSB it is therefore desirable 
to consider what proportion of state funding of contributory benefits this benefit would 
represent. 
The contributory benefits paid out by the social security system should therefore be 
divided into two levels, as proposed by the World Bank. The first would comprise BSB 
and the second the supplement derived from wage-based contributions. Out of the avera-
ge contributory pension of €779.49 per month in 2010, BSB would cover €272.89, i.e. 
35%. This then is the proportion of the public budget for funding contributory benefits that 
would need to be earmarked for funding BSB.
Along with the funding earmarked for contributory social security benefits, unemploy-
ment benefits would also be affected. The unemployed would receive BSB plus a supple-
ment in line with how much they have contributed and for how long. The part of public 
spending on unemployment benefit that would be subsumed into BSB must therefore be 
considered as expenditure, and divided into two levels accordingly. The first comprises 
BSB and the second the supplement derived from the contributions paid. Out of the avera-
ge contributory unemployment benefit of €842.40 per month in 2010, BSB would cover 
€615.66, i.e. 85%, so that is the proportion of the budget for contributory unemployment 
benefits that would have to be earmarked for funding BSB or the basic level.
Together with this funding, the full range of financial resources contributed by the va-
rious public administrations to cover the basic level of benefits totals €72,701.73 million 
in 2010 (Table 1). 
Finally, the “non-contributory pension quota” amount shown is the sum that the ARCs 
of Navarre and the Basque Country (each of which collects its own taxes and pays a quota 
to the state under a special agreement) pay in advance to cover pensions in their respective 
regions that, under their special agreements, are actually payable by the central govern-
ment. All the non-contributory pensions included under this system are lower than BSB, so 
they would be subsumed into it and the full amounts currently earmarked for them would 
go into funding BSB.
5. 12-YEAR SCENARIO
We have now selected an allocation-funding model and worked out the estimated cost 
for the whole population of Spain in 2010. Given that future demographic and economic/
labour trends are unknown, it is now necessary to draw up three potential future scenarios. 
This means establishing demographic and economic forecasts within a given time frame. 
5.1. Introduction 
Changes over time in the population, the economy and the labour market of a country 
have a direct influence on the financial development of its social security system (Cichon 
et al. 1999). To study possible trends in the cost of universal and partial BSB over the next 
12 years, three potential scenarios are posited here in line with the recommendations of 
European Economy (2/2012). 
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In each scenario the demographic, economic and labour-market conditions envisaged 
as prevailing in the coming 12 years are set. Given that the base year is 2010 and confirmed 
figures are already available for the demographic, economic and labour-market situation in 
2011 and 2012, the data are adjusted accordingly in setting up the scenarios.
The following five variables are used to make up each scenario:
1) Population structure by age, to gauge the demographic trend (potential contribu-
tors and number of pensioners expected in the coming years). The general population data 
required are the following (Plamondon et al. 2000):
- Population broken down by age and gender 
- Percentage for fertility & breakdown per gender of births
- Percentage for mortality (PE 2000 NP survey of the general population in Spain)
- Percentages for immigration and emigration and their variations.
2) Economic trend. The main variables that report on the state and development of 
the economy are the following: 
2.1) GDP. 
The percentage of GDP earmarked for BSB serves to measure how much an efficient, 
foresighted public administration could spend without getting into difficulties in circum-
stances of all kinds, including the most adverse (Casassas & Raventós 2011). 
2.2) Variations in the consumer price index (CPI) for the basic products to be covered 
with BSB. Given that the funding model posited sets out to fund BSB for the next 12 years, 
and given that BSB covers expenditure on basic necessities, variations in the price of those 
necessities must be taken into account. 
2.3) Variations in the benefit updating rate. The 12 year time-frame envisages an inter-
est rate for updating the relevant values, free from investment risk.
3) Labour market: the main variables that determine the structure of and potential 
changes in the labour market are the trend in wages and the variation in the number of 
people who switch from one employment status to another3.
Table 2
Technical basis for the three scenarios
 PESSIMISTIC BASELINE OPTIMISTIC
 SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO 3
DEMOGRAPHIC TREND
Fertility percentage 90.00% 100.00% 110.00%
Immigration percentage 90.00% 100.00% 110.00%
Emigration percentage 110.00% 100.00% 90.00%
Mortality percentage PE 2000 NP PE 2000 NP PE 2000 NP
ECONOMIC TREND
Variation in GDP 0.00% 1.00% 2.00%
3  For instance individuals who switch from employed to unemployed, employed to retired or unemployed to 
employed, and people who join the workforce for the first time.
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Variation in updating 
rate 1.50% 2.00% 3.00%
Variation in CPI of BSB 
products
3.00% 2.00% 1.50%
LABOUR MARKET
Trend in wages 0.00% 1.00% 2.00%
Trend in unemployment 3.00% 0.00% -3.00%
Source: Own elaboration.
5.2. Scenarios 
The pessimistic scenario is characterised by a negative trend in all variables. In other 
words the demographic trend shows a moderate decrease in immigration rates and a mo-
derate increase in emigration rates, resulting in a net population decrease. The economic 
trend is negative due to stagnation of the GDP, a positive but low benefit updating rate and 
increases in CPI far greater than those in wages, thus significantly decreasing purchasing 
power. The labour market suffers from stagnation in wages and increasing unemployment 
rates, with the resulting fall in the number of persons in work. 
Under the baseline or neutral scenario all variables are assumed to follow a constant 
trend with no significant fluctuations. This means that the demographic trend shows only 
non-significant variations in immigration and emigration rates. There is stagnation in the 
economic trend due mainly to GDP growth so low that it is close to stagnation, benefit 
updating rate that is positive but moderate and increases in CPI slightly greater than those 
in wages. The labour market undergoes slight wage increases and unemployment rates 
remain steady, with the resulting stagnation in the number of persons in work. 
The optimistic scenario is characterised by a positive trend in all variables. The demo-
graphic trend shows a moderate increase in immigration rates and a moderate decrease in 
emigration rates, resulting in a net increase in population. The economic trend is positive, 
with a positive updating rate and increases in CPI lower than those in wages, thus increa-
sing purchasing power. The labour market shows a moderate increase in wages and falling 
unemployment, so that the number of persons in work increases. 
Finally, the demographic trend expected for the next 12 years (European Economy 
2012) is one of slight growth, with a population increasing from 46 million in 2010  to 48.1 
million in 2020.
5.3. Results
Depending on the variables compared, and on the basis of the hypothetical trends set 
out above, the interval where the BSB system can be found and its trend over the next three 
legislatures (12 years) can be observed. 
Figures 2 & 3 show the intervals in the yearly contribution percentages as a proportion 
of the total wage bill for persons in work required to fund universal or partial BSB. In all 
cases an upward trend is expected in regard to payment of the benefit (be it universal or 
partial), with the state contributions (SC) currently used to fund similar benefits being 
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included in the funding of the BSB. This means that there are parallel decreases in the 
percentages of contributions in all three scenarios.
For universal benefit the three values range from 21.98% for the pessimistic scenario, 
21.13% for the neutral one and 20.29% for the optimistic one in 2010 to 40.28%, 30.16% 
and 24.00% respectively in 2021 (Figure 2).
If state contributions are not included the three values are 34.30% for the pessimis-
tic scenario, 32.97% for the neutral one and 31.67% for the optimistic one in 2010, and 
53.17%, 42.64% and 36.07% respectively in 2021.
Figure 2
Comparison of forecast for universal BSB with & without state contributions (SC)
Source: Own elaboration.
However, the contributions for partial BSB including state contributions (SC) are not so 
high: they range from 2.56%, 2.47% and 2.37% for the pessimistic, neutral and optimistic 
scenarios in 2010 to 11.35%, 6.91% and 4.28% in 2021, as can be seen in Figure 3.
The contributions required for partial BSB not including SC are no higher: they range 
from 14.89%, 14.31% and 13.75% for the pessimistic, neutral and optimistic scenarios in 
2010 to 24.23%, 19.38% and 16.36% in 2021, as also shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3
Comparison of forecast for partial BSB with & without state contributions (SC)
Source: Own elaboration.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Setting up a basic pillar of public social welfare provision in Spain necessarily entails 
determining the extent of the network of provision measures currently in place. That net-
work includes aids, incomes and minimum benefits funded at regional or local level in line 
with devolved authority, or at national level, so a basic level of social welfare provision can 
be said to exist already. However, it is not applied consistently nationwide so there is really 
no common overall benefit per se. The current system of aids has major problems which 
limit its effectiveness in reducing inequality and poverty in Spain. BSB would remedy the 
inconsistencies and shortcomings found in the many schemes now in place, which result in 
differences in the protection provided for different population groups.
Using an allocation-type funding model means that income can be transferred from 
one generation to another and benefits can be assured with the resources available in each 
financial year. In spite of the criticism levelled at this model on the grounds that it takes a 
short-term view (spending and revenues for each financial year), it supports feedback in 
resources and sustainability over time if prudent, appropriate forecasts and provisions are 
implemented so as to maintain a suitable standard of coverage for the population.
The introduction of BSB would mean that the second tier of the system (the contri-
butory pillar) would have to be restructured. On retirement all individuals would receive 
BSB in line with their personal circumstances (place of residence, age, dependents, etc.). 
If the contributions that they have made over their years in work entitle them to an amount 
lower than BSB, that amount would be topped up to the minimum BSB. If their entitlement 
is greater they would receive a supplement over and above BSB in line with their actual 
contributions. 
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Our findings here lead us to conclude that it would be viable and sustainable to set up a 
scheme for BSB covering that part of the Spanish population which does not generate any 
resources in the form of wages.
The scenarios examined indicate that universal BSB would be very costly in terms of 
the percentage of the total wage bill of persons in work required to fund it, but that the cost 
would not be so high for partial BSB, and that a partial protection system could be set up 
and provisioned in practice to cover all those individuals not in work, providing them with 
sufficient income to cover the basic necessities of life. 
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